ITALY AND THE AUSTRO‐SERBIAN CRISIS OF JULY 1914

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geminif4ucorsair
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ITALY AND THE AUSTRO‐SERBIAN CRISIS OF JULY 1914

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ITALY AND THE AUSTRO‐SERBIAN CRISIS OF JULY 1914

Since the beginning of the twentieth century the Balkan Peninsula was one of the most important areas for Italy’s foreign policy. Rome projected upon the Balkans its ambitions of a European power, determined to affirm its political and economic influence. On the other hand, the Balkans was of great importance also in the light of relations between Rome and Vienna.

Italy and Austria‐Hungary were tied by their mutual belonging to the Triple Alliance, but they were at odds on several issues. The attempts to smooth out the disagreements were not sufficient to resolve the tensions that were often fuelled by strategic differences between the two allies. Thus, for Italy, the Balkans constituted a field of confrontation with the Habsburg Empire and the Italian government was determined to prevent any strengthening of Vienna in the Adriatic‐Balkan region, which could hinder Italy’s political and economic ambitions and alter in a dangerous way the balance of power between the two allies, forcing Italy to play the role of a junior partner within the Triple Alliance. T

he Italian diplomacy followed with attention the events in the Balkans, which is why the Italian documents are a very interesting source of history of the region of that period. The objective of this article is to reconstruct, through Italian diplomatic documents, the Austro‐Serbian crisis that followed the assassination of Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo and to analyse the attitude of Italy towards the imminence of the war.
Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo

In the period between the Balkan Wars and the outbreak of the First World War, the relations between Vienna and Belgrade were extremely tense. Austria‐ Hungary was frustrated by the victories of Serbia and Montenegro which undermined Vienna’s role and prestige in the peninsula. Between 1912 and 1913, the two Slavic states had considerably increased their own territory, obtained a common frontier and were then planning a union between them. Furthermore, the Balkan Wars intensified the wish for self‐determination among the South Slavs living in the Habsburg Empire, who regarded Serbia and Montenegro as a successful model of nation states that had emerged from the struggle against foreign rule. In this context, Italian diplomats believed that Bosnia and Herzegovina was not chosen randomly as the seat of military exercise of the Austro‐Hungarian army in June 1914; such a choice had indeed a clear political purpose. With the military exercise and the visit to Sarajevo of Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the Habsburg throne, the Austrian‐Hungarian Empire intended to show its strength and to make a warning both inside and outside its borders.

The Italian consul in Sarajevo, Labia, wrote: "To me it seems (...) that with the presence of the Archduke and of the Chief of Staff of the army [Austria’s] intention was to make a demonstration to Serbia and Montenegro, which, especially after their successes in the Balkan Wars, conducted in these provinces a rather audacious propaganda. On the other hand, it was intended to allow to the archduke to make a political affirmation in front of these populations, carrying out the visit which had already been planned for the summer of 1910, but had been postponed because of the cold reception he had received in Dubrovnik (...)" .1

Thus, according to Labia, the archduke wanted to “show his power and his strong political determination” in Sarajevo and the date chosen for his entry into the Bosnian city contributed to that purpose.
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1 Historical archive of the Italian Foreign Ministry [Asmae], Serie politica, 1891–1916; folder 104, file guerra austro‐serba (hereinafter: Serie P, f. 104), Labia to Sangiuliano, 4 July 1914.
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Franz Ferdinand entered Sarajevo on 28 June 1914, the anniversary of the Kosovo battle, which for the Serbs represented the most important national commemoration. The Italian consul wrote that on the part of the heir to the throne it was rather a “deliberate provocation” or at least a “careless act” to enter Sarajevo on that day, because that surely increased the irritation provoked by his visit in Bosnia.2

The bullets fired by Gavrilo Princip did not only kill Franz Ferdinand, but also undermined Vienna’s attempt to warn its Balkan enemies. In their reports, Italian diplomats described in detail the reactions to the death of the archduke in the Balkans as well as in the rest of the Habsburg Empire. Those reactions are actually very interesting, because through them one may analyse the figure of the late archduke, the political situation and political orientation of the South‐Slavic population of the Dual Monarchy.

The reports of the Italian diplomats underlined that the death of Franz Ferdinand did not shake the public opinion in the Habsburg Empire as much as one could have expected. The archduke was driven by a profoundly reactionary political culture, characterised by the ideas of legitimacy and autocracy that became increasingly inadequate in the cultural horizon of Europe. His political ideas had thus alienated from him the sympathies of the public opinion. Various social and political circles of the Dual Monarchy looked at him with mistrust to such an extent that, according to the Italian ambassador in Vienna, his accession to the throne was “generally feared by all parties, except for the Christian‐Social and Christian‐Feudal parties”. The liberal circles and the Austrian bourgeoisie feared the reactionary tendencies of the late archduke and his connections with the most backward component of the Catholic clergy. Neither the conservative and aristocratic circles regarded him with sympathy, especially after his love marriage with Sophie Chotek, whose nobility rank was largely inferior to the one requested from the wife of an heir to the throne. By marrying her, Franz Ferdinand had broken the customary rules of the Habsburg dynasty, arousing the disapproval of the aristocracy and the overt discontent of the emperor himself.3

The Hungarian political elite looked with suspicion at Franz Ferdinand because of his reform projects, which would have undermined Hungary’s role within the empire. Furthermore, the archduke had never hidden his mistrust for the Hungarians. As a result, the Italian consul in Budapest, Martin Franklin, wrote that “in Hungary (...) all the social classes judged him with dislike.” Therefore the news of his death did not cause real mourning in Budapest, but rather veiled satisfaction.4 The archduke enjoyed political support only among the higher ranks of the armed forces and the Catholic clergy, particularly among the Jesuits. The Italian ambassador in Vienna actually reported that “a military‐clerical party” was gathering around him.5

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2 Ibidem.
3 Ivi, Avarna to Sangiuliano, 5 July 1914.
4 Ivi, Martin Franklin to Sangiuliano, 8 July 1914. Documenti Diplomatici Italiani (hereinafter DDI). Roma: Istituto poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato. Quarta serie, vol. XII, 1964, Martin Franklin to Sangiuliano, 29 June 1914. Doc. 12.
5 Asmae, Serie P, f. 104, Martin Franklin to Sangiuliano, 8 July 1914; Avarna to Sangiuliano, 5 July 1914.
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The bad reputation of Franz Ferdinand was due also to his harsh personality. The Italian consul in Budapest reported that the archduke was “brutal, unpredictable, despotic” and concluded: “archduke Franz Ferdinand was not agreeable, that is something everyone agrees upon. Not even those who were close to him show any special sympathy or favour of him”.6

The aforementioned political and personal factors explain why the death of Franz Ferdinand caused a very limited reaction among the Austro‐Hungarian public opinion in general and in the very capital of the Habsburg Empire. The Italian ambassador in Vienna, Avarna, clearly stated:
the unexpected and tragic death of the heir to the throne has aroused in Vienna and among the population of the monarchy some pity for his unfortunate sons and for the cruel fate that killed the archduke and his wife, but has not aroused any genuine sorrow.7

Not even in Italy was Franz Ferdinand popular; therefore the Italian public opinion was not really impressed by the Sarajevo assassination. Rather interesting is a report of the Serbian ambassador in Rome, who described the reaction in Italy as follows:
The murder in Sarajevo of the Austrian heir to the throne and his wife is received in a somehow strange way. All the newspapers describe the attentat as “horrible”, “inhuman”, “terrible”, but they do not condemn it as one may expect. It could be said that the public opinion, if it does not feel satisfaction, at least has the impression that something unpleasant has been removed. Italians did not like Archduke Ferdinand. Here, he was believed to be inclined towards Slavs and thus not favourably inclined towards Italians. They considered him a reactionary Catholic who supported the Pope’s temporal rights and the leader of those Austrian military circles that are hostile towards Italy. As a would‐be emperor he was a source of concern for all Italian circles and his death did not cause any grief. As a civilised nation, Italians do not express their satisfaction openly, though it can be felt.8

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6 Ivi, Martin Franklin to Sangiuliano, 8 July 1914.
7 Ivi, Avarna to Sangiuliano, 5 July 1914.
8 Poslanstvo Kraljevine Srbije u Italiji Ministarstvu inostranih dela. 18. VI/1. VII 1914. Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Kraljevine Srbije, Knjiga VII, Sveska 2, Beograd 1980, 440.
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Bosnia and Herzegovina after the assassination

Immediately after the attentat Austria‐Hungary accused Serbia of being responsible. In particular Vienna blamed the perpetual anti‐Habsburg campaign directed by Belgrade. On their part, the Italian diplomats agreed with Vienna: Serbian propaganda had excited the irredentist feelings of the Bosnian population and as such it had created a suitable social environment for the organisation of the assassination in Sarajevo. However, Italian diplomats believed that the attentat was also the result of inner conditions of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the Austro‐Hungarian rule. Cora, Italy’s representative in Belgrade, wrote that the attack was the result of “the perpetual, heated hate campaign against the neighbouring monarchy that [in Serbia] takes place in newspapers, rallies and societies”. This campaign “surely had its influence on the exalted mind” of the conspirators. However, Cora also added that the attackers “sacrificed themselves for their persecuted nation”. Likewise, the Italian ambassador in Vienna argued that, by shooting Franz Ferdinand, Gavrilo Princip wanted “to revenge his nationality oppressed” by the Austro‐Hungarian rule.9

The reports of the Italian diplomats offer a general overview of the situation of Bosnia and Herzegovina after the attack and point at the lack of loyalty of the local population towards the Habsburg Empire. After the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, mobs attacked Serbs living in Sarajevo and in other cities of the Dual Monarchy. Though the authorities encouraged anti‐Serb violence, only some “rabble” took part in the riots.10 The vast majority of the Bosnian population was not struck by the death of Franz Ferdinand; on the very 28 June, life in the Bosnian capital remained unchanged, as reported by the consul in Sarajevo: “it cannot be said that this population was deeply struck by the horrible crime. The Sunday habits of leisure and joy did not change at all in the afternoon of that tragic day, although everybody knew about the attack and its sad consequences”.11

Labia concluded that the Austro‐Hungarian rule in Bosnia was rather unstable. The Italian diplomat believed that the Austro‐Hungarian administration had considerably improved the material and moral situation of Bosnia; however the Habsburg Empire could not enjoy a widespread support from local inhabitants. Most of the Bosnian population was actually fiercely hostile towards Vienna’s rule, to such an extent that Labia thought that, when the time came, “this population, in its majority, would be ready and capable to do everything in their power and to pay any price for the victory of the Pan‐Serbian idea or at least to destabilise the Austro‐ Hungarian monarchy, which is believed to be its greatest obstacle”.12

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9 Asmae, Documenti diplomatici, Serie XXII, Serbia 1913–1914. Cora to Sangiuliano, 1 July 1914. Asmae, Serie P, f. 104, Avarna to Sangiuliano, 2 July 1914.
10 Ivi, Labia to Sangiuliano, 30 June 1914. Labia reported that the Austro‐Hungarian authorities “organised the riots or at least voluntarily abstained from preventing them”. The Italian consul in Sarajevo described those who took part in the anti‐Serb riots as “few hundreds of bad guys and rabble”. Ivi, Labia to Sangiuliano, 4 July 1914.
11 Ibidem.
12 Ibidem. For the reactions in Croatia and Slavonia see: Asmae, Serie P, f. 104, Consul in Fiume to Sangiuliano, 23 July 1914. Italian diplomats generally used to refer to Pan‐Serbism, ascribing this feeling also to Bosniaks and Croats; what they meant can therefore be labelled as a Yugoslavian feeling, rather than strictly Pan‐Serbian.

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Some days later, in a long report, the consul in Sarajevo described goals and characteristics of the pro‐
Yugoslav movement, stating that it was widely spread among Bosnia’s inhabitants, regardless of their faith. Analysing the discontent of Bosnians towards the Austro‐ Hungarian rule, on 24 July, before the outbreak of hostilities between Vienna and Belgrade, the Italian consul argued: “Austria has only one way that would give her the possibility to save itself or at least to gain a respite: a decisive, impressive affirmation of force”.13
Vienna’s reaction

Before June 1914, there were various assassination attempts against Austro‐ Hungarian officials in Bosnia and Croatia. Although these attempts generally failed, they represented a warning for the Dual Monarchy. With the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, Vienna’s Balkan problem re‐emerged in all its gravity and the Austro‐ Hungarian government had to find a solution without delay. Furthermore, the murder of the heir to the throne represented an event that could justify strong measures and thus legitimate Vienna’s reprisals against those who, inside and outside the borders of the empire, opposed its rule in the Balkans. Italy’s representative in Belgrade wrote:
it is clear that in Austria they are trying to take advantage of these circumstances in order to get rid of those political personalities who appear annoying in their opposition to [the Austro‐Hungarian] rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to break apart the Serbo‐Croatian block. Therefore, [the Austro‐Hungarian authorities] accused Major Pribićević (who has been ill for several months), because his brother [Svetozar Pribićević] is member of the Croatian Parliament, they arrested Mr. Jeftanović, who is the father‐in‐law of Spalajković, Serbia’s minister in Petersburg, whose hostility towards Austria is well known, they blamed general Janković, who is the president and leader of “Narodna odbrana”.14

While Vienna took repressive measures to counter inner dissent, it also directed its policy towards Belgrade. For the Austro‐Hungarian authorities, the South Slavs’ wish for self‐determination was strictly related to Serbia’s propaganda and subversion activities. Shortly after the death of Franz Ferdinand, Austria‐Hungary began a political and media campaign, whose aim was to hold Serbia accountable for the Sarajevo assassination. The main objective of this campaign driven by Austro‐ Hungarian officials and newspapers was to prepare both the public opinion and European diplomacy for the adoption of strong measures against Serbia.15

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13 Asmae, Serie P, f. 104, Labia to Sangiuliano, 24 July 1914.
14 Ivi, Cora to Sangiuliano, 7 July 1914.
15 Immediately the Austro‐Hungarian foreign minister, Berchtold, claimed that Serbia was involved in the plot that led to the assassination of Franz Ferdinand; Asmae, Documenti

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Realizing Vienna’s aggressive intentions, the Serbian government kept a very moderate attitude, which was in stark contrast to the warmongering mood spreading over the Austro‐Hungarian public. Italy’s representative in Belgrade, Cora, described Serbia’s attitude as follows:
Despite the escalation of the mood of the rabble against the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, despite the allegations and the cruel remarks published in the Austro‐Hungarian and German press, which described Belgrade as a nest of murderers, and despite the claims of the involvement of the Serbian government in the plot, which would have been organised here, the government and the public opinion in Serbia have maintained a quiet and proper behaviour, in order to avoid any pretext for recrimination on the part of Austria (...).16
Italian diplomats believed that Austria‐Hungary was eager to use the Sarajevo assassination as a pretext for legitimizing its aggressive policy towards Serbia.

On 15 July, from Belgrade, Cora summed up the situation: “it seems that Austria wants to transform the Sarajevo trial, which had to be a trial against two killers, into a trial against Pan‐Serbism and Serbia and hasten in this way the unavoidable conflict.” A day later he argued: “it is very clear that while the Serbian government is trying in all ways to avoid any complication, Austria wants to keep tensions growing”.17


Italy and the July crisis

As days passed by, Italian diplomacy received more and more clues about Vienna’s plans, until 17 July, when Italy’s minister of foreign affairs, Antonino di Sangiuliano, dispelled any doubt: “it seems that Austria‐Hungary, supported by Germany, both of them convinced that Russia will not intervene, will present unacceptable demands to Serbia, in order to have an excuse to attack and crush it, and then will probably annex some territories”.18

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i, Serie XXII, Serbia 1913–1914. Avarna to Sangiuliano, 4 July 1914. Regarding the Austro‐Hungarian press, whose commentaries were aimed to “excite” the public opinion, see: Asmae, Serie P, f. 104, Martin Franklin to Sangiuliano, 4 July 1914.
16 Ivi, Cora to Sangiuliano, 7 July 1914.
17 Asmae, Documenti diplomatici, Serie XXII, Serbia 1913–1914. Cora to Sangiuliano, 15 July 1914; DDI, Cora to Sangiuliano, 16 July 1914. Doc. 285.
18 DDI, Sangiuliano to Bollati, Carlotti, Avarna and Fasciotti, 17 July 1914. Doc. 311. It is probable that Sangiuliano was informed about Austro‐Hungary’s intentions by Flotow, Germany’s ambassador to Italy, who spent some days with the Italian minister in the thermal resort of Fiuggi.

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Sangiuliano did not know the exact demands of the Austro‐Hungarian ultimatum, however he knew that Vienna’s real diplomatic purpose was to get a denial from Belgrade. The Austro‐Hungarian demands were formulated in such a way that they were unacceptable for a sovereign state and Serbia’s government would have thus rejected them. That would have provided the Habsburg government with a pretext to declare war on Serbia. The Italian minister confirmed all of his suspicions when he finally read the text of the Austro‐Hungarian declaration to Serbia. Sangiuliano stated that the Austro‐Hungarian demands were “deeply offensive for Serbia and indirectly even for Russia”; presenting those demands the Dual Monarchy “clearly showed that it wants war”.19

The Austro‐Hungarian bellicose attitude posed a threat to Italian interests in the Balkans and Sangiuliano had to think what position Italy should take. Despite its alliance with Italy, Vienna did not inform the Italian diplomacy of its plans, and neither did it ask for Italy’s approval of the ultimatum. The Italian government took advantage of that omission, in order to distance itself from Austria‐Hungary and to claim that Italy had no obligation to intervene in the conflict. According to the Treaty of the Triple Alliance, each party had to intervene in case of aggression against other parties. But the current Austro‐Serbian war was not a war of self‐defence for Vienna. Sangiuliano pointed out that the Austro‐Serbian conflict was the result of the aggressive policy of the Dual Monarchy. Rome had thus no obligation to intervene to help its ally, not even if Russia and other countries were to get involved, since in any case Vienna bore the responsibility for the outbreak of the conflict. Sangiuliano clearly stated that any possible European conflagration would be “the consequence of Austria’s aggressive and provocative behaviour”, which is why Vienna could not count on Italy’s support.20

Apart from the rules of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance, Italy’s refusal to support Vienna was due to an analysis of the situation and the risks and opportunities it presented for Italy. In the Adriatic and Balkan region, Sangiuliano’s policy was always oriented to prevent any extension of the Habsburg Empire, either through the annexation of new lands, or the projection of Vienna’s influence on other states. This was actually the fundamental axis of Italy’s foreign policy towards the Albanian question and the possible union of Serbia and Montenegro. Such a priority also highlights the complexity of Italy’s approach to the Balkans. Italy surely had its own preferences in each regional question; however, regional questions were relevant also for Italy’s relations with Vienna.

The need to prevent any strengthening of the Habsburg Empire was actually the key priority for Italy, with all other objectives being of lesser importance. Before the July crisis entered its crucial phase, Sangiuliano explained that in the Balkans Italy had to “prevent any territorial expansion of Austria”, at least if such an expansion was not counterbalanced by an “adequate territorial compensation” for Italy.21
19 DDI, Sangiuliano to Bollati and Avarna, 24 July 1914. Doc. 488; Sangiuliano to Imperiali, Bollati, Avarna, Carlotti, Ruspoli, 28 July 1914. Doc. 673.
20 DDI, Sangiuliano to Bollati and Avarna, 24 July 1914. Doc. 488; Sangiuliano to Imperiali, Bollati, Avarna, Carlotti, Ruspoli, 28 July 1914. Doc. 673; Sangiuliano to Bollati and Avarna, 28 July 1914. Doc. 672.
21 DDI, Sangiuliano to Bollati, 14 July 1914. Doc. 225.
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That was Sangiuliano’s key priority in Albaniaand Montenegro, and of course the same principle applied also to the Austro‐Serbian crisis. Therefore, when Germany tried to convince Rome to support its allies, the Italian minister replied that, for Italy “the existence of an independent and strong Serbia as a counterweight, a balance factor and a bulwark against any Austrian expansion in the Balkan Peninsula is a top priority”.22 If the Italian government had offered military or diplomatic support to Vienna’s aggression against Serbia, it would have, therefore, acted against its own interests.

In search for territorial gains Sangiuliano’s first reaction to the Austro‐Hungarian ultimatum was intended to mark a distance between Italy and the Dual Monarchy, thus ensuring full autonomy to Italy’s diplomatic maneuver. Italian diplomats strongly reaffirmed this position to European governments and above all to Vienna and Berlin. However, Sangiuliano also asked Italian diplomats to keep discreet about Italy’s possible choices in case of war, as well as to avoid any compromising statement on that issue. Italy’s position on the Austro‐Hungarian ultimatum was described as follows by the foreign minister: “at the moment we have no reason to take any stand”.23

As Vienna showed its aggressive intentions, Sangiuliano opted for a wait‐and‐see policy. After all, Rome had no immediate obligation to support any side and as the situation evolved the Italian government could have adopted one position or another depending on its own interests. Italy clearly stated its policy to the allies of the Triple Alliance, particularly to Germany. Relations between Rome and Berlin were actually much warmer than those between Rome and Vienna and the German government was often called upon to help to solve disputes between Italy and the Habsburg Empire. Talking to the representatives of Germany and Austria‐Hungary, Sangiuliano did not exclude the possibility of offering political and possibly military support to Vienna, but only if that would prove profitable to Italy. The minister explained that the lack of any obligation to take part in the conflict, “does not exclude the possibility that the Italian government may help Austria, if it is in Italy’s interest to do that”.24

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22 DDI, Sangiuliano to Bollati and Avarna, 28 July 1914. Doc. 644.
23 DDI, Sangiuliano to Bollati and Avarna, 24 July 1914. Doc. 488.
24 DDI, Sangiuliano to Imperiali, Bollati, Avarna, Carlotti, Ruspoli, 28 July 1914. Doc. 673. See also: Sangiuliano to Bollati and Avarna, 28 July 1914. Doc. 644.

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Sangiuliano actually asked for territorial compensations in exchange for the support Italy could offer to its allies. Sangiuliano believed that his demands had a basis in the Treaty of the Triple Alliance, whose Article VII stated that in case Vienna annexed new territories in the Balkans, Italy should be compensated. Before the Austro‐Serbian crisis, Sangiuliano had already raised the issue of compensation in relation to the possible annexation of Albanian and Montenegrin lands by the Dual Monarchy.

As we have seen, Italy opposed any enlargement of the Habsburg Empire, but the Italian opposition could fall if such an enlargement was counterbalanced by adequate territorial gains for Italy. Sangiuliano thought there were two possible compensations for Italy: some Albanian lands or rather a “part of the Italian‐ populated territories” under the Austro‐Hungarian rule, Trentino in particular. In his analysis Sangiuliano took into account various elements. On one hand, he thought that Italy’s rule over the Albanian city of Vlore would have restored the balance of power between Rome and Vienna in the Adriatic region. The annexation of Trentino to Italy would not have had the same strategic value, but the minister was aware that the latter option was the most favoured by the Italian public opinion, as it was commonly believed that Italy should extend its territory to the Italian‐speaking provinces still under the Austro‐Hungarian rule. As the outbreak of the war came closer, Sangiuliano himself seemed to prefer this option and referred to “some of the Italian‐populated lands of Austria” as “the only possible territorial compensation”.25

Distancing itself from the Austro‐Hungarian ultimatum, Italy did not intend to disavow the Triple Alliance, but rather to persuade its allies to take into account Italy’s interests. Sangiuliano had this aim in mind when he asked Italian diplomats to keep a friendly attitude towards Austria‐Hungary, even when they had to declare Italy’s refusal to support Vienna’s aggressive policy against Serbia. Furthermore, Sangiuliano did not wait for the allies to make their proposals, but he himself urged Vienna and Berlin to begin talks about the compensation issue. The Italian foreign minister also warned the allies that, if Italy could not reach with them an agreement on the compensation issue, to defend its interests Italy was obliged to oppose Vienna’s war. In a bid to put pressure on Berlin and Vienna, Sangiuliano went forward, envisaging that Italy could get involved in the war, but on the other side of the trench, in order to prevent possible Austro‐Hungarian expansion.26

Sangiuliano’s thinly veiled threat did not suffice to convince the allies. Germany was ready to recognise Italy’s right to territorial compensations; Berlin, however, was also aware that it was hardly conceivable for Vienna to give up on Trentino. Berlin exerted some pressure on the Austro‐Hungarian government, but German diplomacy was not willing to engage in the mediation role that Italy asked for. Thus the German government urged Italy to talk directly to the Dual Monarchy.27

Vienna actually denied that Italy’s claim for compensation had any basis in the Treaty of the Triple Alliance. One year earlier, the Austro‐Hungarian government had already stated that according to its interpretation Article VII of the Treaty referred only to Ottoman territories: putting an end to the Ottoman rule in Europe, the Balkan Wars had altered the political map of the region, making Article VII obsolete.

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25 DDI, Sangiuliano to Bollati, 14 July 1914. Doc. 225; Sangiuliano to Bollati and Avarna, 27 July 1914. Doc. 575.
26 DDI, Sangiuliano to Bollati and Avarna, 27 July 1914. Doc. 575.
27 DDI, Sangiuliano to Bollati and Avarna, 24 July 1914. Doc. 488; Bollati to Sangiuliano, 25 July 1914. Doc. 524.

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However Austria‐Hungary tried to reassure Italy by stating that it was not its aim to annex new
territories at Serbia’s expense.28

The Austro‐Hungarian government changed its position only at the beginning of August, when it was clear that the war was to involve the whole Europe. Ensuring Italy’s support and possibly its participation was then the key objective for the Triple Alliance and for that reason Germany increased its pressure on Vienna. But contrary to Italy’s demands, the Habsburg government retained the position that Italy had to share the burden of the war effort in order to lay its claims for compensation. Furthermore, any possible compensation could not be made at the expense of Austria‐Hungary and was therefore out of question for Vienna to give up on Trentino or any other land of the Dual Monarchy.29

The Habsburg government thus changed only partially its position, but it was probably too late. Vienna’s refusal to accept the Italian demands strengthened Italy’s neutralist option. The declaration of neutrality was officially proclaimed by the Italian government on 3 August, but even earlier neutrality was Sangiuliano’s preferred option. Summing up the situation to the Italian king, the foreign minister did not exclude possible participation in the conflict in the future, but he thought that it was unlikely and risky for Italy.30

Moreover, at that time Italy was shaken by deep social unrest and the country’s military was unprepared to face a large‐scale conflict. It can be thus stated that Italy’s neutrality was due to various factors, which went far beyond foreign policy options and included the country’s inner situation.31

On the other hand, even after the declaration of neutrality, Sangiuliano maintained his talks with Germany and Austria‐Hungary in view of a possible Italian intervention. Furthermore, since August the Italian minister started talks also with the Entente Powers. He always retained neutrality as the best option for Italy, but he also aimed to evaluate which alliance could better meet Italy’s interests. For Sangiuliano therefore neutrality was not a matter of principle, but rather a starting point for a possible negotiation. Italy had no contractual obligation to intervene and for Sangiuliano that meant that Italy could “decide in one way or another”.32

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28 DDI, Avarna to Sangiuliano, 24 July 1914. Doc. 493; Avarna to Sangiuliano, 29 July 1914. Doc. 681. 29 DDI, Avarna to Sangiuliano, 1 August 1914. Doc. 848; Sangiuliano to Bollati and Avarna, 30 July 1914. Doc. 754. Sangiuliano to Bollati, 1 August 1914. Doc. 839.
30 DDI Sangiuliano to Vittorio Emanuele III, 24 July 1914. Doc. 470. DDI, quinta serie vol. I, 1954. Avarna to Sangiuliano, 2 August 1914. Doc. 15, footnote 2.
31 In his memories Antonio Salandra, Italy’s premier during the July crisis, often remarked on Italy’s unreadiness for war; A. Salandra, La neutralità italiana. 1914. Ricordi e pensieri. Milano: Mondadori, 1928; see for example pages 83, 243ff. See also: DDI, Sangiuliano to Avarna, 2 August 1914. Doc. 2, where Sangiuliano also argued that Italy was largely unprepared for war. 32 DDI, Sangiuliano to Imperiali, Avarna, Bollati, Carlotti, Ruspoli, 29 July 1914. Doc. 682.

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As a consequence, Italy’s position in the future remained open, depending on the calculation of risks and opportunities.

The Italian government would later resume talks with Berlin and Vienna about a possible cession of Trentino, but the political scenario of those negotiations was very different from that of the July crisis. During the July crisis, Italy’s neutrality affected the entire European scenario, as it deprived the Triple Alliance of its inner cohesion.33


The uneasy alliance between Rome and Vienna

Before the July crisis, relations between Rome and Vienna were already tense and most of the differences between the two countries were related to the Balkans. For that reason, throughout the month of July, Sangiuliano strove to avoid direct negotiations with Austria‐Hungary, fearing that, without Germany’s mediation, talks would lead to a failure, thus further worsening the relations between Rome and Vienna. Tensions between Italy and the Dual Monarchy worried Italian diplomats, and Italy’s representatives in Berlin and Vienna discussed several times the issue with Sangiuliano. Summing up the situation, on 8 July the Italian ambassador in Berlin, Bollati, wrote a long letter to the minister of foreign affairs, where he revealed all the critical issues that affected the relations between Italy and the Habsburg Empire. He argued that the crisis between the two countries was not caused just by occasional issues, but was far deeper and more complex. Bollati believed that tensions between the two countries dated back to “more ancient, long‐lasting and even more serious causes”, among which there was “Austria’s rule over Italian‐populated and Italian speaking lands, which according to at least nine‐tenths of the Italians living in the Kingdom [of Italy], belong de jure to Italy and should sooner or later belong to Italy also de facto”. Considering carefully the situation Bollati argued:
In fact, probably there is not a single question in which the interests of Italy are not, or at least are not believed to be, in contrast with those of Austria, in which the policy of each of the two governments is not intended to monitor and very often to fight that of the other, to protect itself against it, inspired by the conviction that what brings advantages to one, must necessarily bring damage to the other. Furthermore, there are so many differences and so many rivalries between the basic culture of the ruling elite and the public opinion of the two countries!34

In some cases alliances are not strengthened by common interests but rather by a common enemy. Neither that can be the case for the alliance between Rome and Vienna; on the contrary Bollati wrote:
"Besides, this was also the opinion of German diplomacy, which believed that the inner cohesion of the Triple Alliance would have discouraged other countries to intervene on Serbia’s side; DDI, Sangiuliano to Bollati and Avarna, 28 July 1914. Doc. 644.

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34 DDI, Bollati to Sangiuliano, 8 July 1914. Doc. 120.

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If there is hatred in Italy’s popular consciousness, that’s the hatred against our very ally; in Austria, actually, there is not even that, and one could even say that Austria hates especially itself, so strong and deep are the hostilities among the various nationalities of the Dual Monarchy.35

The Italian diplomat believed there was no way to improve the relations between Rome and Vienna and he went on further to propose the end of such an uneasy alliance. In his opinion, that could made bilateral relations better, since Rome and Vienna would no longer be required by their alliance to deal with long and exhausting negotiations in order to find a common position. Sangiuliano was fully aware of the problems described by Bollati and he himself remarked that, despite his efforts to improve the image of Austria‐Hungary, the Italian public opinion tended to consider it “a ruthless enemy, sometimes overt, sometimes deceitful”, at the same time believing that Italy’s alliance with the Dual Monarchy was “naive, cowardly, damaging”.

Sangiuliano admitted also the possibility that Rome could leave the Triple Alliance in the future, but at the moment he rejected this hypothesis, because he believed Germany and Austria‐Hungary to be military stronger than the Entente powers, at least in terms of ground warfare. The Italian minister also believed that it was precisely the land warfare that would make the difference in possible confrontation between the two alliance blocks.36

Although in July 1914 Italy rejected the hypothesis of breaking its alliance with Vienna, it is important to note that such a hypothesis already existed within the Italian diplomacy, not to mention the public opinion that, despite the government’s efforts, could never consider Vienna a truly ally. The arguments put forward by Bollati and at least partially acknowledged by Sangiuliano, are very interesting because they reveal the critical nature of the alliance between Rome and Vienna, but foremost because they include almost all the reasons that only several months after the July crisis made Italy to disavow the Triple Alliance and join the opposite front in the war against Austria‐Hungary.

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35 Ibidem. On the tense relations between Rome and Vienna see also: DDI, Avarna to Sangiuliano, 11 July 1914. Doc. 154. After the outbreak of the war Bollati adopted a different perspective and advocated Italy’s intervention to support Germany and Austria‐Hungary as the only way to save Italy’s international prestige. See: Salandra, La neutralità italiana, 147–149.
36 DDI, Sangiuliano to Bollati, 14 July 1914. Doc. 225.

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Source:

The Institute of History Belgrade Collection of Works, vol. 28
Sapienza University of Rome

Editors in chief
Srđan Rudić, Ph.D. Prof. Antonello Biagini, Ph.D.
Editor
Biljana Vučetić, Ph.D.
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