Light Infantry...

[Slash78]

So, will SR-CW have 'Light Infantry' as leg infantry? That is one of the issues I've always have had with SR2010. Once you give Light Infantry motorized transport it is no longer light infantry.

Though the US did develop light Motorized Infantry as part of the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized). After Vietnam the Army under Creighton Abrams began a push to mechanize most of it's forces. It was continued until General Edward Meyer halted to conversions and began looking at ways to improve the Infantry Divisions. The 9th Infantry Division was designated a High Technology Test Bet. It was changed to Light Division Test Bed and then with the advent of the Light Infantry Divisions it became the Motorized Division Test Bed.

The 9th ID used large numbers of humvees as place holders for purpose built vehicles. The first choice was the LAV-25 (when the Marines started buying them). Congress shot it down. They used large numbers of Humvees with TOWs as a placeholder for Assault Gun Systems (CCV-L, Expeditionary Tank, Stringray) being developed. That too got canceled. The Army got stuck with the Humvee placeholders. While the Stryker evolved from the motorized requirement the Army has forgotten one thing. The Light Infantry Divisions as formed under the Reagan Administration should never have been formed as they were and the Stryker now shouldn't be seen as a 'bridge' between 'light and heavy forces' it should exist in place of light infantry units.

And before people get too excited about how 'well' light infantry work in rugged terrain and in cities, we've seen how well they don't work in cities. In Panama it was a mechanized infantry unit with Vietnam era M113A1s (ie, not improved A2s or A3s) that attacked through Panama City and took the heavily defended PDF Headquarters. We've seen how well light infantry doesn't work in cities in Somalia. And in the jungles of South East Asia? http://www.history.army.mil/books/vietn ... /index.htm Mounted Combat in Vietnam. Mechanized forces moved farther, with greater firepower and staying power and were less vulnerable then their foot-mobile counterparts. Or the VC/NVA they were fighting. And we shouldn't forget it was the foot-mobile and air-mobile light infantry forces of ARVN that were finally defeated by a NVA that used every single AFV they could get their hands on in 1975.

[Col_Travis]

Trust me I know, a good friend of mine was in the 1/9 IR when all this started hapening. Most light Infantry then and now has been leg/air mobile period!

[dust off]

So, will SR-CW have 'Light Infantry' as leg infantry? That is one of the issues I've always have had with SR2010. Once you give Light Infantry motorized transport it is no longer light infantry.

Though the US did develop light Motorized Infantry as part of the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized). After Vietnam the Army under Creighton Abrams began a push to mechanize most of it's forces. It was continued until General Edward Meyer halted to conversions and began looking at ways to improve the Infantry Divisions. The 9th Infantry Division was designated a High Technology Test Bet. It was changed to Light Division Test Bed and then with the advent of the Light Infantry Divisions it became the Motorized Division Test Bed.

The 9th ID used large numbers of humvees as place holders for purpose built vehicles. The first choice was the LAV-25 (when the Marines started buying them). Congress shot it down. They used large numbers of Humvees with TOWs as a placeholder for Assault Gun Systems (CCV-L, Expeditionary Tank, Stringray) being developed. That too got canceled. The Army got stuck with the Humvee placeholders. While the Stryker evolved from the motorized requirement the Army has forgotten one thing. The Light Infantry Divisions as formed under the Reagan Administration should never have been formed as they were and the Stryker now shouldn't be seen as a 'bridge' between 'light and heavy forces' it should exist in place of light infantry units.

And before people get too excited about how 'well' light infantry work in rugged terrain and in cities, we've seen how well they don't work in cities. In Panama it was a mechanized infantry unit with Vietnam era M113A1s (ie, not improved A2s or A3s) that attacked through Panama City and took the heavily defended PDF Headquarters. We've seen how well light infantry doesn't work in cities in Somalia. And in the jungles of South East Asia? http://www.history.army.mil/books/vietn ... /index.htm Mounted Combat in Vietnam. Mechanized forces moved farther, with greater firepower and staying power and were less vulnerable then their foot-mobile counterparts. Or the VC/NVA they were fighting. And we shouldn't forget it was the foot-mobile and air-mobile light infantry forces of ARVN that were finally defeated by a NVA that used every single AFV they could get their hands on in 1975.

I came across this idea elsewhere recently. It's very interesting, and maybe suggests that there is a myth about light being best for urban and other terrain. Air Mobile/Assault benifits more on the operational level. Maybe it's same with light. Have you got any ideas what LI would ideally look like? In my day motorised was considered light too.

That said, with modern infantry weapons we may be entering a new period of dismount superioity. But obviously if the dismounts have a ride and ammo store on tracks with a gun then all the better.

[Slash78]

I came across this idea elsewhere recently. It's very interesting, and maybe suggests that there is a myth about light being best for urban and other terrain. Air Mobile/Assault benifits more on the operational level. Maybe it's same with light. Have you got any ideas what LI would ideally look like? In my day motorised was considered light too.

That said, with modern infantry weapons we may be entering a new period of dismount superioity. But obviously if the dismounts have a ride and ammo store on tracks with a gun then all the better.

I'll go for the second part first. What 'modern infantry weapons' do you speak? The Javilen ATGM is a very capable 'infantry' weapon, but it weighs (around 50 LB for launcher and missile) a lot and is quite expensive ($125,000 per laucher, $75,000 per missile). A dismounted company-sized unit is likely to have a very finite quanity of launchers and a limited number of reloads. While they might be able to discourage an attack by mechanized forces for a limited time they hardly give dismounted troops a 'decisive' advantage. Other weapons, like the 25mm Airburst Objective Crew Served weapon (and .50cal counterpart) were light weight, but the ammo's weight is still a problem. All the weapon systems mentioned are as highly vulnerable to small arms, grenades, mortars, etc as the rest of the dismounted force. The reality is that US dismounted troops have little more firepower then their Vietnam equiviant. And when dismounted they have no more mobility nor saying power. And only a slight increase in protection, which is good if you're hit in the right area by small arms fire, but doesn't do too much good against the HE. At the end of the day you fall into the same trap. Light units, to do all but the simplest, most benign missions or go anywhere, are co-dependent on long-range indirect fire, air support and inorganic transport.

As for the first part, Light Infantry-true light infantry-has limited utility. What good is light infantry, air mobile/assault or not at the 'operational level' if an enemy can either 1) bog it down and inflict losses at the tactical level by using militia/irregulars or 2) can either out maneuver it or out fight it with mechanized forces. I fear the day when a group of dismounted Marines or Army Rangers, 10th MD, or Airborne/Air Assault troops actually comes directly up against a marginally competent mechanized force.

The irony is that in 1980 the US already had plenty of lighter weight mounted infantry they could have called 'motorized'. The problem is that they rode around in light weight M113s (dont' call it a Gavin) which was to be replaced with the Bradley. The M113 was less then ideal. The first ones had gas engines (burn, baby, burn). The A1s (1964) when to desiel, A2s (1979) added some extra belly armor (too little, too late). It wasn't until the A3 (1987) that they added more internal protection and greatly improved reliablity (same engine as LAV-25, other improvements). As for the aluminium construction, only a idiot would ride around in a thin steal vehicle on the modern battlefield and feel protected simply because of the material. You need several layers of various materials to protect you. The upside with an aluminium hull is there is weight savings (that can be put into more armor) and it's less prone to stress factures and corrosion. One thing this US never did with the M113 was increase protection with the times. Then again, people have to die before the Army does anything (even the simple things like bringing gunshields back). Even as late as 1990 a large number of Army 'mechanized infantry' were still equipped with M113s (mostly old A1s, only some A2s). And in Panama the Army was surprised how well the 'obsolete' M113 worked...
http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/J ... tCause.htm

The equipment the U.S. forces used, even items being phased out of the Army inventory, consistently received high marks. Though seemingly outdated or nearing obsolescence, the 90-mm. recoilless rifle, the AH-1 attack helicopter, the UH-1 utility helicopter, and the M113 APC all performed quite well and sometimes were better adapted to the tactical situation than more contemporary materiel.

Maybe I should make a long answer short. The Strykers should be considered the 'light' forces and a heavy force needs to be maintained. The upcoming GCV should be split into to parts. One a 'light' vehicle in the 15-20 ton margin (preferability tracked) with the protection of no less then a Cat-1 MRAP versus mines/IEDs and good all around protection to replace the M113, Stryker and many lighter MRAPs (especially the M-ATVs). A heavy vehicle in the 30-45 ton range, definately tracked to replace the Bradley and heaviest MRAPs. You can't do both with the same vehicle and if you try, you'll end up with the same problems that the early-model Bradleys had.

[Cutlass]

That said, with modern infantry weapons we may be entering a new period of dismount superioity. But obviously if the dismounts have a ride and ammo store on tracks with a gun then all the better.

<looks around and sees an opportunity to pull one of his favorite hobby horses out for a ride >

IMHO that would depend on just what weapons the infantry are armed with. If they continue (at least for the U.S.) to be armed with weapons chambered in demonstrated substandard nonperforming calibers like the .223 Remington (5.56 x 45mm NATO) then they are going to NEED something with a larger, heavier weapon nearby for support.

Fortunately, at least in the early portions of the Cold War, U.S. forces were armed with real infantry weapons chambered in real rifle calibers, the .30-06 Springfield and the .308 Winchester (7.62 x 51mm NATO). Both the .30-06 Springfield and the .308 Winchester (7.62 x 51mm NATO) have gone on to win world wide acclaim both as good hunting cartridges as well as for long range accuracy.

I knew a gentleman who had worked as a mercenary in the Belgian Congo. His unit used HK-91's chambered in .308. They occasionally had to deal with such problems as cantankerous hippos, torqued off elephants and lions that hunted them as well as the guerillas they were sent there to kill in the first place. He claimed that with proper bullet placement the .308 could take anything that walked. By way of contrast, the .223 Remington (5.56 x 45mm NATO) is illegal for use on deer in several States here in the U.S. because it can not reliably get a clean kill on a deer.

For those who feel that the .308 and the weapons made for it are too large, too heavy and recoil too much (in other words, wimps ) there are a wide variety of decent alternatives available. While I am usually loathe to proclaim the virtues of a caliber and weapon combination on the basis of mere ballistics data, nevertheless the 6.8mm Remington SPC looks like it could be a good choice. There are also several different 6.5mm and 7mm calibers that could do a good job as fodder for an infantry combat weapon that was both lighter and had less recoil than the .308 and the platforms that use it while still doing a reasonable job as far as their terminal performance was concerned. Thus a perceived need for a lighter weapon that recoils less does not necessarily entail saddling the poor dumb bastards on the sharp end of things with a caliber and rifle combination that can't do the job.

All that being said and understood, regardless of how one designs whatever vehicle the infantry are going to be riding around in, there will invariably be situations where the infantry need to go places where the vehicle can't. Some of those situations will be where a specialized leg infantry unit without vehicles is going to be the only viable alternative, such as certain types of mountain warfare, some of the triple canopy rain forest and or obnoxious swamps out there, and possibly some urban city terrain where the layout predates automobiles and is not friendly to vehicles in general. Oops, I better mention horse mounted infantry at least in passing lest I incur the wrath of Col_Travis . But as I have maintained in other posts in other threads, they too are a "niche" unit and not a general purpose unit.

Other than in those types of terrain, infantry is probably better off being mounted in vehicles to take advantage of increased travel speeds, increased protection available from the design of the vehicle, increased firepower of vehicle mounted weapons (even if they're only medium and or heavy machineguns) as well as has already been pointed out, increased ability to carry more stuff such as more rifle ammunition and other specialized munitions, medical supplies, etc... . Thus as I see it, the standard "general purpose" infantry unit these days should be a vehicle mounted unit. I'll let other people who are more familiar with such things go into the details of just what those vehicles should look like. It might be that a reasonable case could be made for having two variants available, a "light" and a "heavy".

Personally I have a bias in favor of amphibious designs, but also realize that in the real world that comes with a premuim of increased design and build costs, increased maintenance costs, and finally the potential for things to go spectacularly wrong in the worst possible way. At the very least it gives the crew one more thing to worry about. Unfortunately the alternatives are either to have a lot of bridging units on hand that can keep up with the infantry, have a lot more specialized engineering units available that can do the same thing, or design the vehicles to be easily heli-lifted over river and other water obstacles. Which is no problem as long as the helicopters are available and the weather cooperates, but such is not always the case.

[Col_Travis]

Cutlass, I agree with you on the cal. question. When I was in we were equipted with surpluss British L1A1/C1A1 7.62N FN-FAL's and trained to use them.

Slash78, it apears that you have forgoten that British Airborne went up against a very competant Mechinized force at Arnhem, Bittrich's II SS Panzer Corps or the American 101st Airborne at Bastone against Joachim Peiper.

During the Cold War, the Soviet Group of Forces Germany (all 20 Dvn's) was predomantly composed of units that were amphibous, both tracked and wheeled and were equiped with tactical level air assault forces as was the bulk of the Pact forces facing of against NATO. The Bundesheer was required to take a pounding, including Tactical Airborne/Air Assault opperations while the US, Canada the UK and the rest of NATO could mobilize there forces and then conduct a Strategic War.

[Slash78]

The Waffen SS has always been hyped. Most of it's officers were incompetent political appointees and party loyalists. Marketgarden was a disaster. As for the Battle of the Bulge, the 101st took a bloody beating. Yes, they held on but at a massive cost. To win wars you have to go on the offensive, not hide in fox holes and let the war come to you.

While changing the size of the bullet might not hurt, but to think that it will give US forces a decisive get it just plain stupidity. And not giving them vehicles they need on the off chance that they might not be able to go some places is even worse. There is some terrain not worth fighting for. If the enemy retreats into that terrain you just stop them from bringing in food and starve them out (or to death). There is no reason to 'go in after them'. And if they are able to get enough food in to support a fairly large force then there is obviously a way to get vehicles in. And if the enemy can, you can.

You need to STOP MAKING EXCUSES for past and current failure by rationalizing it.

And on top of it is the cardinal sin. A tank or IFV can't clear a building. How do you get to that building? How do you get to the block the building is on? How do you get to the town the building is in? How do you get to the 'restricted terrain' were the enemy is hiding? Walk? Sure, it will take for ever an you're likely end up dead long before you get their. Killed by enemy who don't subscribe to the mindless, chest-thumping ideology that only says good, old fasion No-Can-Do foot slogging is the only way REAL MEN FIGHT. They are more then happy to shoot and the Wirly-Birds as they fly over or plant bombs and run away knowing you're too dumb to live, much less win.

And of course there is one last issue. How do you know what kind of terrain you're vehicles can and can't go on if you're too much of a coward to test it? Why must you assume the only good 'tank country' is where an entire Armored Division can form up on line and maneuver? I don't know, but Baghdad was much better 'tank country' then it will ever be 'light infantry country'. It's amazing how in nearly 10 years of fighting in 'armored graveyard' of Afghanistan the Soviets lost only 147 tanks, about 1.25 a month. And they were mostly older T-55s and T-62s. It was the graveyard of lightly armored, roadbound wheeled vehicles and of helicopters (were 333 were lost).

Soviet equipment losses included 118 jets, 333 helicopters, 147 tanks, 1314 armored personnel carriers, 433 artillery pieces or mortars, 1138 communications or CP vehicles, 510 engineering vehicles and 11,369 trucks. Many of these losses were on the highways, and a key loss was the large amount of cargo-carrying trucks.

From http://www.ciaonet.org/cbr/cbr00/video/ ... td_52.html and most of the APCs lost were crappy BTRs. No wonder the Russians have replace their BTRs with APC versions of the MT-LB in the their 'peacekeeping' troops (because the BTRs can't haddle terrain in Georgia, the Balkans or the Caucasus any better then they did in Afghanistan).

[Col_Travis]

The Waffen SS has always been hyped. Most of it's officers were incompetent political appointees and party loyalists. Marketgarden was a disaster. As for the Battle of the Bulge, the 101st took a bloody beating. Yes, they held on but at a massive cost. To win wars you have to go on the offensive, not hide in fox holes and let the war come to you.

While changing the size of the bullet might not hurt, but to think that it will give US forces a decisive get it just plain stupidity. And not giving them vehicles they need on the off chance that they might not be able to go some places is even worse. There is some terrain not worth fighting for. If the enemy retreats into that terrain you just stop them from bringing in food and starve them out (or to death). There is no reason to 'go in after them'. And if they are able to get enough food in to support a fairly large force then there is obviously a way to get vehicles in. And if the enemy can, you can.

You need to STOP MAKING EXCUSES for past and current failure by rationalizing it.

And on top of it is the cardinal sin. A tank or IFV can't clear a building. How do you get to that building? How do you get to the block the building is on? How do you get to the town the building is in? How do you get to the 'restricted terrain' were the enemy is hiding? Walk? Sure, it will take for ever an you're likely end up dead long before you get their. Killed by enemy who don't subscribe to the mindless, chest-thumping ideology that only says good, old fasion No-Can-Do foot slogging is the only way REAL MEN FIGHT. They are more then happy to shoot and the Wirly-Birds as they fly over or plant bombs and run away knowing you're too dumb to live, much less win.

And of course there is one last issue. How do you know what kind of terrain you're vehicles can and can't go on if you're too much of a coward to test it? Why must you assume the only good 'tank country' is where an entire Armored Division can form up on line and maneuver? I don't know, but Baghdad was much better 'tank country' then it will ever be 'light infantry country'. It's amazing how in nearly 10 years of fighting in 'armored graveyard' of Afghanistan the Soviets lost only 147 tanks, about 1.25 a month. And they were mostly older T-55s and T-62s. It was the graveyard of lightly armored, roadbound wheeled vehicles and of helicopters (were 333 were lost).

Soviet equipment losses included 118 jets, 333 helicopters, 147 tanks, 1314 armored personnel carriers, 433 artillery pieces or mortars, 1138 communications or CP vehicles, 510 engineering vehicles and 11,369 trucks. Many of these losses were on the highways, and a key loss was the large amount of cargo-carrying trucks.

From http://www.ciaonet.org/cbr/cbr00/video/ ... td_52.html and most of the APCs lost were crappy BTRs. No wonder the Russians have replace their BTRs with APC versions of the MT-LB in the their 'peacekeeping' troops (because the BTRs can't haddle terrain in Georgia, the Balkans or the Caucasus any better then they did in Afghanistan).

First of all what in the hell are you talking about? And second what are you talking about?

[Col_Travis]

Damm Califaonians!

[Cutlass]

I plead guilty to having a tendency to ramble in my posts, but I think somebody needs to take a breather and read what I wrote as opposed to simply skimming it and reacting to the first things that strike them.

My bottom line was that the vast majority of one's infantry forces should be mechanized and I seem to be getting dumped on for that by the guy who was touting mechanized infantry all along.

[dust off]

I plead guilty to having a tendency to ramble in my posts...
My bottom line was that the vast majority of one's infantry forces should be mechanized and I seem to be getting dumped on .

Cutass and Col_Travis, keep up.
We are talking about light infantry and tanks. Mostly tanks. Big, hard tanks, with wide rears that dominate urban environments. Any colour tanks with curved or angular surfaces, and maybe warm to touch in the desert sun.

[Slash78]

Cutless, you're right. I didn't read the whole thing. I read the part about bullet size then the comment about vehicles not being able to get everywhere infantry needs to go. It was like waving a red flag in front of a bull and you lost me. Hence the rant.

[Col_Travis]

The Waffen SS has always been hyped. Most of it's officers were incompetent political appointees and party loyalists. Marketgarden was a disaster. As for the Battle of the Bulge, the 101st took a bloody beating. Yes, they held on but at a massive cost. To win wars you have to go on the offensive, not hide in fox holes and let the war come to you.

While changing the size of the bullet might not hurt, but to think that it will give US forces a decisive get it just plain stupidity. And not giving them vehicles they need on the off chance that they might not be able to go some places is even worse. There is some terrain not worth fighting for. If the enemy retreats into that terrain you just stop them from bringing in food and starve them out (or to death). There is no reason to 'go in after them'. And if they are able to get enough food in to support a fairly large force then there is obviously a way to get vehicles in. And if the enemy can, you can.

You need to STOP MAKING EXCUSES for past and current failure by rationalizing it.

And on top of it is the cardinal sin. A tank or IFV can't clear a building. How do you get to that building? How do you get to the block the building is on? How do you get to the town the building is in? How do you get to the 'restricted terrain' were the enemy is hiding? Walk? Sure, it will take for ever an you're likely end up dead long before you get their. Killed by enemy who don't subscribe to the mindless, chest-thumping ideology that only says good, old fasion No-Can-Do foot slogging is the only way REAL MEN FIGHT. They are more then happy to shoot and the Wirly-Birds as they fly over or plant bombs and run away knowing you're too dumb to live, much less win.

And of course there is one last issue. How do you know what kind of terrain you're vehicles can and can't go on if you're too much of a coward to test it? Why must you assume the only good 'tank country' is where an entire Armored Division can form up on line and maneuver? I don't know, but Baghdad was much better 'tank country' then it will ever be 'light infantry country'. It's amazing how in nearly 10 years of fighting in 'armored graveyard' of Afghanistan the Soviets lost only 147 tanks, about 1.25 a month. And they were mostly older T-55s and T-62s. It was the graveyard of lightly armored, roadbound wheeled vehicles and of helicopters (were 333 were lost).

Soviet equipment losses included 118 jets, 333 helicopters, 147 tanks, 1314 armored personnel carriers, 433 artillery pieces or mortars, 1138 communications or CP vehicles, 510 engineering vehicles and 11,369 trucks. Many of these losses were on the highways, and a key loss was the large amount of cargo-carrying trucks.

From http://www.ciaonet.org/cbr/cbr00/video/ ... td_52.html and most of the APCs lost were crappy BTRs. No wonder the Russians have replace their BTRs with APC versions of the MT-LB in the their 'peacekeeping' troops (because the BTRs can't haddle terrain in Georgia, the Balkans or the Caucasus any better then they did in Afghanistan).

And yet the Canadian Army still continues to use LAV's in British Columbia and the Yukon were any type of road is at a premium, it kinda of makes you think what there up to.

[Balthagor]

...and most of the APCs lost were crappy BTRs...

Now I'm far from being an expert on the Soviet/Afghan war, but indulge me a moment. I understood that most of their ground losses where BTRs because those where the vehicles which could navigate the mountain roads where most AT gun ambushes where placed?

Not saying I'm for or against the general use of armor, just following the conversation...

It also occurs to me that Canadian forces are currently using LAVs in Afghanistan and I have the impression that the US is using more Strykers/LAVs than Abrams in Iraq currently, although those are not full out conflicts.

[Slash78]

...and most of the APCs lost were crappy BTRs...

Now I'm far from being an expert on the Soviet/Afghan war, but indulge me a moment. I understood that most of their ground losses where BTRs because those where the vehicles which could navigate the mountain roads where most AT gun ambushes where placed?

Not saying I'm for or against the general use of armor, just following the conversation...

It also occurs to me that Canadian forces are currently using LAVs in Afghanistan and I have the impression that the US is using more Strykers/LAVs than Abrams in Iraq currently, although those are not full out conflicts.

They used a lot of BTRs because they made up the majority of the poorly trained, poorly motivated conscripts the Soviets sent to Afghanistan (the majority were troops the Soviets didn't want to risk in a war against NATO or to guard the Chinese Border). They could go up the mountain roads, but were usually stuck to the roads where ever they went. The were thinly armored and they are difficult to get in and out of. Especially in a hurry in a combat situation. It didn't help that the Soviet infantry riding in them spent much of the time sick because of poor sanitation and sub-standard medical care available for Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

Didn't the Canadians pull most of their LAV IIIs out of Afghanistan after 2006 in favor for upgraded M113s (TLAV) and Leopard 1s (then Leopard 2s)?

Yes, the US is using a lot of Strykers in both Iraq and Afganistan. 5th Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division (now 2nd Brigade) was hard hit in its year in Afghanistan. And you should question the US Army. This was the same bunch that insisted that unarmored and lightly armored Humvees were good enough for the first year of the Iraq occupation and denied their was a problem.

And again, the Russians, because of their experiences in Afghanistan, the Balkans, Chechnya and Georgia have replaced BTRs in select units with MT-LBs because they are better suited to the terrain.